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RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED LAW

SCHOOLS: MACRO-DYNAMICS IN
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE
PROFESSOR LYNN BuzzARD*
I do want to begin at what I assume to be one of our principal concerns. That is, the character of the Christian university or Christian law
school. I propose to examine several major themes or dimensions that I
believe surround the whole issue today concerning the role of the religiously affiliated law school.
I share with many of you who have spoken the conviction that the
core issues here are not primarily about accreditation. Those are symbolic issues. Those are illustrations of much larger dynamics. You probably have heard the story, it circulates in churches in two or three
different versions, of the man who is leaving the plant and every day
when he goes out he has a wheelbarrow with him, and some sort of rags
in it. The authorities were convinced he was stealing something. And
every day they'd stop him at the gate to go through and see what he had
in the wheelbarrow. They'd look underneath it and search the rags.
They were just absolutely convinced he was stealing something; but
never could find anything. This went on for months and months. Finally, at some terminal event when it no longer made any difference,
they asked him, "Look, we know you've been stealing something. What
is it?" Of course, the answer: "Wheelbarrows."
The story illustrates the potential for missing the obvious, and more
central dimension. Our concern with accreditation runs the risk of missing the larger dynamic of what is really going on. We could win the little
battles with AALS or some Rule 211(e) or something, and lose on more
fundamental questions. So it's those larger dimensions that I want to
address.
The first one concerns the issue, touched on by others, of the crisis of
identity in Christian schools, in religiously affiliated schools. What I perceive, as many of you have also commented, is a growing loss of confidence in the authority of the religious or Christian proclamation they
have to make. In that sense, most of the injury we suffer is self inflicted.
Sometimes it's simply because of the tremendous need for these institutions to gain social or political acceptance, or donations from founda* Professor of Law, Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, Campbell University.
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tions or businesses that cause them to water down their unique
character.
Other times, equally sadly, it's because of a loss of confidence in the
truth of their moral and theological convictions. Other times, it's a theological error, in my perspective-the prevalence of a kind of schizophrenia that divides the sacred and the secular. Such a view sees the
Lordship of Christ as having tremendous influence in areas of prayer
meetings and gospel songs, but has almost nothing to do with the nature
of a law school curriculum, the substance of law, or the questions of vocation and calling of students.
Schools so afflicted may take seriously their religious venture, but
reduce it to courses on ethics or professional responsibility or a prayer
breakfast. I had the occasion to attend two Catholic law schools. One of
them, represented here, was Notre Dame. It was my experience that at
Notre Dame the religious character of the institution was transparent,
open, proud; in fact, I've told many of my friends I had more classes in
the first year at the Notre Dame law school that began with prayer than
in three years at the Duke Divinity School where I graduated. That
seems to come as no surprise to those familiar with Duke. I attended
another Catholic law school, however, in which its religious character
was totally missing. There was not the slightest hint of any religious
commitment in that institution. Not a single professor that I ever had at
that institution had the remotest interest in religion, and most of them
disdained it.
It seems to me that in American religious history, particularly in the
evangelical tradition in which I have my roots, this schizophrenia, separating the sacred and the secular, has been too common, too easily a part
of our subculture. The frontier did not encourage Christians to think
about issues of public policy and law. Christians retreated into realms of
piety alone, and forgot to engage the culture at large.
So my first concern has to do with this loss of authority. Now, you
see, it seems to me a Christian institution might well have a conviction
that there are some moral absolutes and some ultimate authority. It
might assume that there would be a fundamental clash at times between
its moral and theological convictions and those of the culture world. In
fact, if it took Paul's counsel in Romans seriously, it would expect a very
serious clash with the world, which was attempting to squeeze it into its
mold, and this world would not even understand the blindness that it was
in. So a Christian institution would not expect the "Cosmocrats," as
Paul describes them in Ephesians and in Colossians, to affirm or even

1995]

RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED LAW SCHOOLS

understand the special character of the Christian understanding and
mission.
A second critical factor in this larger perspective of what's going on is
the loss of the sense of the moral and religious roots of law. It is the
essence of Harold Berman's insight when he talked about a "massive
loss of confidence in the law." For Christians, for those who come to law
from an historical, or even just a generally religious perspective, the inquiry into religious aspects of law is not some mere appendage, some
sort of curious hobby of the religious-an affectation of religious law
schools. It is rather one of the central core jurisprudential questions that
is inescapable. In fact, the problems today in law are partly an inadequate realization of these inevitably religious, ultimate dimensions of
law. Law's tendency to retreat today to technique and procedure, is, in
fact, a part of an unwillingness to engage in moral and value and ultimate conversations about law. The cultural patterns observed by critics
like James Wilson, Richard Neuhaus, Harold Berman, Steven Carter,
when applied to law, contribute to this failure of law to be addressed in
our public institutions in a principled way.
It is inevitable that law reflects somebody's fundamental values. As
one scholar noted, especially in areas like constitutional law, the language is like empty boxes that are going to be filled with underlying
philosophic values. In that context, religious communities inevitably
have something to contribute to that conversation and a legitimate role
to play in the context of legal education.
The third general cultural pattern that troubles many of us, and is, I
believe, part of what's going on is the legitimacy of the religious community's theological, constitutional, and political concern with intrusive regulations by government and other organizations over private institutions.
It surely is ironic that a nation founded on concerns about abusive bureaucracies, whether government or private, should so easily be sliding
into a regulatory arena that increasingly affects higher education in the
United States.
In our tradition at Campbell University, as Baptists, we have special
reasons to be nervous about bureaucracies and authorities and governments. Besides that, the risks to diversity, the risks to religion from oppressive governments, from oppressive agencies, is well established.
How ironic that in an age when we're finally seeing the demise of the
authoritarian states of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union we should
find very little pause in our own country with the increasing nature of
the regulatory state. Many who observe the role of accrediting agencies
have warned of the potential abuses of the ABA and AALS accredita-
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tion powers. The ABA and AALS are not a unique threat. Other accrediting bodies have shown their potential to squeeze compliance.
A prominent and highly respected West Coast seminary, for example,
was initially denied accreditation for its graduate psychology program
because it refused to teach that homosexuality was a legitimate alternative lifestyle. The potential for this kind of regulatory arena by both
government and private organizations is a serious intrusion into the kind
of autonomy in the university that has been part of its long and rich
heritage.
Fourth, it seems to me that one cannot look at the aim of the pressures on religious law schools without recognizing it is part of a larger
pattern of the diminished interest in vigorous religious freedom. We
have seen a pattern in our nation, shifting from the affirmation of religious liberty in which religious liberty was celebrated and affirmed as a
contributor to the body politic to a time when religion was tolerated in
the way in which the majority might have tolerated the Jehovah's Witnesses: They pose a little inconvenience, ringing on your doorbell once
in a while, but they're kind of quaint. And it's good to have the Amish
around on vacation time, but nobody really takes them as having any
serious contribution to make.
Increasingly, almost all religious groups have been seen by powerful
interests in this sort of quaint Amish arena-tolerated, but not particularly valued. Religious ideas and themes are increasingly perceived as
irrelevant and divisive. Now some of this plays itself out in constitutional jurisprudence of the free exercise clause, as has already been suggested by the comments of others. Religious liberty, for example, may
be substantially diminished by simply defining religion in very narrow
ecclesiastic or liturgical ways, so that when churches "do schools,"
they're not doing religion any more, and the protections of religious liberty are not applicable.
If that doesn't work, the certainly growing technique of finding selfexecuting, compelling state interests and least intrusive means seems to
be common. The regulatory agencies, simply by announcing regulations,
in effect create their own compelling interest and least restrictive means,
therefore trumping the legitimate religious liberty interest that might
have been applicable even under the older Sherbet test.
Quite apart, however, from the jurisprudence of the First Amendment, is what appears to be a social and intellectual ideology that's hostile to the notion of absolutes and convictions. It is the very thing Bloom
suggested has been going on in the American university. A religious law
school may well be seen by people described by Bloom as an institution
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that has no real place in modern education. If, after all, the quest for
truth has been abandoned in favor of relativism, then the religious
school that takes seriously the notion that there are some moral absolutes and some authority and some truth will certainly not be welcomed
into the community of universities.
The emphasis on the ultimate value of pluralism similarly works
against the distinctive of religious freedom and religious distinctives. If
pluralism is mandated not simply at the macro level, but at every institution, then the very definition of pluralism will assure its destructionbecause all must look alike. A distinctive institution that contributed to
overall diversity would be rejected because it was itself not "pluralistic."
I'm reminded of the observation that pluralism is a word that a society
uses on its way from one orthodoxy to another. But today's pluralism is
often skewed-accepts all ideas, including the strangest ideas, except
those ideas that happen to be linked with a traditional religious point of
view. Those ideas are suspect, and excluded. The marginalization of
religion to the fringes, to the closets, to the private arena, works clearly
against any sense of a vigorous religious law school. I'm reminded of the
observation of a columnist in the Wall Street Journal, who noted that in
his observation with his own colleagues in the press that if he ever went
to dinner with a group or was sitting around and having a conversation
with some of his colleagues, and he mentioned a religious value or a
religious principle-he wrote about this, "It was as if I had farted." He
went on, "There was this strange silence. No one reprimanded me. No
one said I had done something wrong. But there was sort of a consensus
in the group I had acted socially inappropriately and people would turn
the other way." Now, that is to a large extent precisely what is happening in a cultural context. A religious law school will be perceived by
many precisely in that context.
Now lastly, let me suggest in this broad overview of forces and issues
that the concern for the legitimacy of a religiously affiliated law school is
not simply to allow religious schools to do their own thing. That would
not be legitimate. And indeed I suppose we ought to affirm a maximum
freedom for people with religious convictions to carry out those for their
own integrity, for their own purity of conscience. But in the larger perspective Christians come to an arena like law not asking simply to be left
alone. Not asking for the legal profession to allow us to be the Amish in
the legal world and maintain our little carts. Rather we come to the
arena of law and the culture suggesting that the perspectives and insights
and moral principles and traditions that animate our points of view are
legitimate contenders in the body politic for the health and character of
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public society. We ask not only that we be allowed to articulate those in
our own privacy, but to genuinely compete in the marketplace of ideas,
in the struggles in our own culture. And we believe that those traditions
that have shaped our own religious life and our own institutions can
speak to the crisis of our day. In fact, how ironic it would be if in a day
in which the issues that our nation and world face in terms of biogenetic
engineering, the use of world resources, war and peace, and human
rights, there would be a cultural effort to silence the rich resources and
traditions of religious communities. Or to suggest that it would be invalid for religious communities to try to create the kind of critical mass of
scholarship that can struggle with issues and put them into sharp relief,
and place them before the larger public community.
I was in the Republic of Georgia two years ago, at the time of great
transition there. And as I was talking with the Chief Justice of the Georgian Supreme Court, we walked out of his office to a large hall. At one
corner there was a podium with nothing on it. He saw me looking at the
podium and said, "You know, until a few months ago, the bust of Lenin
was on that podium." He said, "We're now trying to figure out what to
put in its place."
The comment was a sort of cultural message-a symbol, a parable, of
a crisis in much of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union about on
what basis shall its education, its law, its philosophy, its schools, be built.
Having shattered one ideology, on what ideology can the culture be rebuilt? The same issue is, I believe, a very lively one in our own culture.
On what will this society be built? Can you build a culture solely on
notions of individual freedom. That will not, I am convinced, sustain
culture. It will not sustain values. It will not sustain families, intellectual
life, or enable the maturity of persons. We are in a place today where it's
not simply religious liberty that is at stake, but the culture that is at issue.
C.S. Lewis, writing about the tendency in the British educational system to strip the schools from moral teaching on some sort of theory that
it would be inappropriate to impose on these young people the moral
principles of their parents, suggested by analogy how dangerous this was.
He said, "We castrate and bid the geldings multiply." We remove the
very resources of life and health and vitality, and yet complain that we
lack heroism and moral strength in our society.
In the context of values and visions, the religious law school has a
vital contribution to make. George Orwell, who for so many years
bemoaned the religious dominance in Europe and yearned for the day
when the yoke of religion could be thrown off the British and European
culture, wrote later in his life about his dismay at the success of his

1995]

RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED LAW SCHOOLS

289

dream. At one point he said, "I thought of a cruel trick I once played on
a wasp. A wasp had landed on my plate, and was sucking jam. I took
my knife and I cut it in half. The jam still trickled out of its esophagus.
The wasp didn't have any idea of the dreadful thing that had happened
to him until he tried to fly away."

